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ABSTRACT

Tursic, Kelly E. M.A., School of Public and International Affairs, Wright State University, 2021.
China’s Legal Environment for Domestic NGOs: Standardized Policies for Greater Party-State
Control over Civil Society.

This thesis examines one angle of state-society relations in authoritarian states through the lens
of Chinese nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and their legal environment. While
grassroots organizations have not prompted political liberalization in China, they have not been
entirely co-opted by the party-state either. Through an examination of policy changes, a study of
120 organizations, and a case study of a non-profit incubator, this thesis explores whether the
political environment for China’s domestic NGOs varies by geographic region and issue area.
The findings suggest there is not significant variation as the party-state has implemented
standardized policies for increased control over civil society.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) fall within the category of civil society, which
Larry Diamond (1994) defines as “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, selfgenerating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or
set of shared rules” (p. 5). On a domestic level, states and non-state actors are often at odds with
each other due to competing interests. The primary democratic function of civil society is
limiting state power (Diamond, 1994). Therefore, authoritarian regimes may see NGOs as a
threat to political stability. On the other hand, the services NGOs provide can be invaluable to
the government as they alleviate pressure from the state’s own resources. NGOs can thus provide
services that the government is unable or unwilling to provide. What factors affect the statesociety relationship in non-democracies? Do regional differences and issue areas account for
variation in the state’s perception of grassroots groups?
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state with a substantial number
of NGOs, and it has established an increasingly robust legal framework with which to govern
them. Estimates vary greatly on the number of NGOs that exist in China. This dispute in
numbers comes from their legal registration status as well as scholars’ disagreement on how
much autonomy they must have from the government to be considered an NGO.
The legal environment has tended to vary by region. With China’s increasingly
standardized policies towards NGOs, is there significant variation by region and issue area in
what organizations have been registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA)? While
evenly applied practices would aid China’s image of uniformity, sensitivity towards certain issue
areas and varying resource environments would cause organizations to be registered differently.
Studying this variation can not only lead to a more comprehensive understanding of state-society
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relations in China, but to a better understanding of how large authoritarian regimes weigh the
costs and benefits of civil society growth.
Literature Review
While some scholars have focused on the democratization potential of NGOs through
their role in civil society, others have shown that these organizations are severely restricted and
co-opted by the state. In “Governing Civil Society: The Political Logic of NGO–State Relations
under Dictatorship,” Christopher Heurlin (2010) argues that authoritarian regimes tend to employ
one of two strategies to control non-governmental organizations. The first is a corporatist
strategy in which organizations are co-opted by the state through a variety of mechanisms.
Examples include high barriers for registration and the creation of government-organized NGOs
(GONGOs) as a way to justify the rejection of independent ones. Heurlin argues that single-party
states are more likely to use the corporatist strategy. The other option is a strategy of exclusion in
which NGOs are kept from growing mostly through ad hoc measures rather than being
incorporated into the state apparatus.
Larry Diamond (1994) states that both civil society and the authoritarian corporatist state
depend on socioeconomic development; civil society groups rise up and demand political
freedoms with socioeconomic development, while state-sponsored organizations lose legitimacy
when there is rampant corruption and socioeconomic decay. Valerie Bunce (2003) echoes this
concept with her discussion of the role of mass mobilization in democratization. Supporting a
rational choice perspective, Bunce describes the influential role of mass-based protests and how
it indicates a loss of authoritarian order and can lead to democratic transition. Since
nongovernmental organizations can advocate for changes that increase mass-based pressure,
authoritarian states can view NGOs as destabilizing forces and seek to limit their operations.
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China scholars have adjusted their approaches to studying NGO developments as a result
of observed changes in Chinese state-society relations throughout different time periods. The
first method assesses NGOs from a normative neo-Tocquevillean approach of focusing on the
autonomy of civil associations from the state and their ability to contribute to democratization
(Xu, 2014, p. 92). Many China scholars anticipated democratization as China opened itself to the
world after the late 1970s, but after the 1989 Tiananmen protests, China curtailed the
development of civil society. Thereafter, many scholars abandoned the democratization approach
in their study of Chinese organizations (Hsu, 2014, p. 98).
The second main approach to examining civil society in China derives from a corporatist
approach developed to study NGOs in non-democratic countries (Wang, Fei, & Song, 2015, p.
413). Scholars who describe state-society relations with the corporatist approach point to the
many restrictions the Chinese government has placed on official NGO registration. For example,
the dual management system requires a government sponsor to endorse and supervise the
operations of the organization before the NGO is eligible to submit its application for a legal
status (Liu, 2013). The corporatist approach also stresses the state’s strategy for consolidating
power through its creation of GONGOs, or government-organized nongovernmental
organizations, to stave off democratization (Xu, 2014, p. 92). However, some China scholars
have found the approach inadequate for describing the nature of China’s state-society relations.
The third approach considers the restrictions but looks beyond a state-society duality to
examine the complexities of the relationship. This contingent approach was developed by China
scholars to address contextual factors within the NGO-government relationship (Wang et al.,
2015, p. 415). Anthony Spires coined the term “contingent symbiosis” to describe the mutual
dependency between the state and these organizations. In many cases, instead of shutting down
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technically illegal, unregistered grassroots organizations, the local government allowed them to
operate autonomously in a legal gray area so long as they handle controversial social issues
quietly and effectively (Spires, 2011).
Jessica Teets (2015) describes a continuum of autonomous and supervised models of
social management in China, with Guangdong Province representing a more autonomous model,
while Beijing represents a more supervised model. She argues policy in Yunnan Province
represents a convergence of the two models. Other scholars have studied NGOs’ funding
strategies that vary according to the resource environment of the region and affect citizen
engagement. They observed three main models of donor dependence, state dependence, and
volunteer dependence (Hsu, Hsu, & Hasmath, 2017).
China’s recent increase in laws concerning NGOs highlights the treatment of various
types of NGOs and reflects the state’s prioritization of formally regulating these organizations
and minimizing previously acceptable loopholes. The most recent examples are the 2016 Charity
Law of the People’s Republic of China, the 2017 Law on the Management of the Domestic
Activities of Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations in China (hereafter, Foreign NGO Law),
and the 2018 draft the Regulations for the Registration Management of Social Organizations.1
The dual management system for registration requires a government sponsor to endorse and
supervise the operations of the organization before the NGO is eligible to submit its application
for legal status to the Civil Affairs Bureau. In some regions such as Guangdong Province, this
restriction was relaxed in 2012 to allow cultural, economic, social service, and recreational
organizations to register directly with the Civil Affairs Bureau without a sponsor. This policy
may be implemented nationally if it is included in the final version of Regulations for the
1

In Chinese:《中国人民共和国慈善法》、《境外非政府组织境内活动管理法》、《社会组织登记管理条例
(草案征求意见稿)》
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Registration Management of Social Organizations. Both the laws and remaining gray areas in
China provide an ideal platform with which to study the state’s interactions with civil society.
Methodology and Research Design
For the first part of my study, I examine discrepancies within the Ministry of Civil
Affairs’ database of registered social organizations. I cross-reference entries of organizations
from various regions in China Development Brief’s online NGO directory with search results in
the MoCA database. I then analyze trends of which of the organizations did and did not appear in
the MoCA database. Both websites are dynamic, so the study captures data that is current from
the time of collection. The MoCA database has columns for the organizations’ registration date
and status. The status types are “normal” (正常), “cancelled” (注销), and “revoked” (撤销).
China Development Brief (CDB) is a bilingual independent platform created in 1996 that
publicizes news and information on civil society in China. Its NGO Directory features
organizations operating in China that have voluntarily provided their basic information to China
Development Brief. NGOs can advertise open employment positions through China
Development Brief’s Job Directory page. Both the Chinese and English sides of the website
repost articles from newspapers and websites that pertain to China’s NGO sector, but China
Development Brief does produce its own reports as well. In order to inform Western scholars and
NGO professionals about information most pertinent to them, China Development Brief’s
English website contains more articles and information on laws affecting foreign NGO operating
in China than the Chinese-language side of the website does. Notably, the description on the
English site contains language like “civil society” that is not present on the Chinese site, which
could indicate sensitivity surrounding certain topics and the implications of democratization.
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The Ministry of Civil Affairs is a ministry within China’s State Council that was founded
in 1978. In addition to managing the registration of domestic NGOs and monitoring their
operations, the Ministry of Civil Affairs also develops and oversees policies on social welfare,
disaster response, and marriage, among others. In April 2017, the Ministry of Civil Affairs
created an online database for the public that contains registration information on about 700,000
social organizations in China. The database is intended to give people a method to look up the
name of an organization to determine whether or not it is legitimate.
I have selected 30 organizations based in Beijing, Guangdong, Yunnan, and Gansu for a
total of 120 organizations. I use the filtering feature on the Chinese page of China Development
Brief’s NGO directory because there are only 339 total Chinese organizations on the English
page while there are 2,344 on the Chinese page. I set the filters to domestic organizations (机构
型类：国内机构) working in all sectors (工作领域：全部) that operate in Mainland China (工
作地点：中国大陆). I leave the filter for the order of appearance on the default of when the
organizations were entered into the website (排序方式：注册时间). Then, I set a filter for each
of my chosen provinces (or province-level division in the case of the municipality of Beijing)
and, one by one, copy the names of the first 15 and the last 15 entries into the Ministry of Civil
Affairs’ database. I compare region, sector specialty, and any information on the organizations’
registration status to determine if any patterns exist. For those organizations who do not appear
in the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ database, I attempt to determine from China Development Brief
and the organizations’ own websites, when available, what their legal registration status is. Due
to the inclusive nature of China Development Brief’s NGO Directory and the narrowly defined
definitions of what constitutes a “social organization” that is required to register with the
Ministry of Civil Affairs, it is possible that some entries not listed in the government database
6

still have a legal status, albeit a different type. This nuance only enhances my study as it
highlights the complex bureaucracy NGOs must navigate.
I have chosen Beijing, Guangdong, Yunnan, and Gansu because of their representation in
the literature on social management models, their varying levels of economic development, and
their geographic location within China. They are in the northeast, southeast, southwest, and
northwest, respectively. Both Beijing and Guangdong are significantly more economically
developed than Yunnan and Gansu. Although literature on NGOs in Gansu is uncommon
compared to the other three locations, I have chosen it because it is one of the least economically
developed provinces in China, and I want to compare my findings with those on Yunnan, which
also has low economic development.
For the second part of my study, I conduct a case study of a non-profit incubator based on
observations from a four-month unpaid internship at Enpai Non-Profit Organization
Development Center’s office in Nanjing in 2017 as well as published literature on the
organization and the NGOs it assists across China. I discuss the history of the organization’s
development as well as its relationship with the Ministry of Civil Affairs.
Considering time and financial constraints for this study, I rely on the currently published
information from the time of data collection and do not obtain information on the day-to-day
operations of the selected organizations. Based on the sources of my data, China’s restrictive
political environment presents some limitations for my study. I rely on data publicly available
through a Chinese government website as well as data published through a Chinese non-state
actor’s website, so it is very possible that entries are arbitrarily erased. However, given the
positive domestic press on China’s state crackdown on illegal organizations and the politically
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neutral content of China Development Brief’s website, I am able to make meaningful
comparisons.
Hypotheses
1. Most, but not all, of the organizations in China Development Brief’s NGO Directory will be
able to be found in the Ministry of Civil Affairs database.
I base this hypothesis on findings in the literature that some NGOs do not register with
the government at all or register with the for-profit businesses. However, I hypothesize that more
than half will still be found in the MoCA database because I assume a willingness to publicize
their information on a public forum indicates a lack of fear of government inspection of their
registration. An organization’s registration status is important because it signals a level of
government-sanctioned legitimacy and compliance with increasingly standardized bureaucratic
policies.
2. Organizations specializing in more sensitive issues (LGBT+ issues, migrant labor rights, leftbehind children) might be listed in CDB directory but not in MoCA database.
These organizations may be allowed to operate in a legal gray area as an indication of
tacit government approval of the services they provide without the formal endorsement that
comes with official registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs.
3. Provinces with more developed economies (Beijing and Guangdong) will have a lower
proportion of organizations listed in the Ministry of Civil Affairs database.
With higher numbers of total NGOs in these locations, some might be able to slip through
the cracks easier. Also, with the state dependency model noted in the literature for Yunnan, the
state may take a more active role in ensuring proper registration in Yunnan and Gansu (Hsu,
Hsu, & Hasmath, 2017).
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4. Due to lower levels of economic development, I expect that Yunnan and Gansu will have a
higher number of organizations dedicated to poverty alleviation and education than Beijing
and Guangdong.
These organizations will be listed in the MoCA database because the local government
will want to recognize their work and take credit for supporting it.
Chapter Outline
The next chapter provides historical background, particularly on the development on
China’s legislation towards NGOs. The third chapter presents my cases and analyzes patterns
that emerge as the cases are compared by region and sector. The fourth chapter examines how a
non-profit incubator has reacted to and shaped the landscape of state-society relations in China.
The final chapter discusses the broader implications of this study’s findings.
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Chapter 2: China’s NGO Policies
Globally, the term “nongovernmental organization” was not commonly used until after
the formation of the United Nations in 1945, when the UN needed to clarify the participation
rights for private bodies in its Charter. Rather than simply remaining as UN jargon, the term
NGO entered popular lexicon. While there is no universally accepted definition, fundamentally,
NGOs must be independent from government control, not a political party, non-profit, noncriminal, and non-violent (Willetts, 2002). It should be noted that the term “NGO” used in this
paper encompasses small groups that might otherwise be known as “civil society organizations,”
“grassroots nongovernmental organizations,” or “community-based organizations.” In much of
the literature on these organizations in China, these groups are often simply referred to as
“nongovernmental organizations,” so that is the term used for them here as well. These
organizations, which are established by Chinese people within China for local or national causes,
are the focus of the paper rather than international NGOs.
Chinese NGO Terminology
The existence of multiple terms for the same or similar types of organizations is not
limited to the English language. In China the letters “NGO” are sometimes used, but there are
also multiple terms in Mandarin that are used, and they can vary according to context. The
Chinese Communist Party prefers to refer to nongovernmental organizations as “nonprofit
organizations” (非营利组织 feiyingli zuzhi) because “nongovernment” (非政府 feizhengfu) in
Chinese carries the connotation of “anti-government” (Ma, 2002, p. 308). This precision of
speech exemplifies the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) wariness of these organizations.
Leaders of Chinese NGOs have nicknamed their government supervisors needed for official
registration as their “mother-in-law” to draw a comparison with the social norm of an
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antagonistic relationship (Ma, 2002, p. 309). Another common term for NGOs in Mandarin is
“public welfare organization” (公益组织 gongyi zuzhi) and “among-the-citizens organization”
(民间组织 minjian zuzhi). However, the legal term used for organizations registered with the
Ministry of Civil Affairs is “social organizations” (社会组织 shehui zuzhi). They are further
broken down into social groups, social service organizations (formerly referred to as private nonenterprise units), and foundations.
China now has over 800,000 registered social organizations, but the NGO sector did not
start blossoming in China until relatively recently (Bo, 2019; National Bureau of Statistics,
2019). Most Chinese people had not even heard of the word “NGO” until 1995, when the United
Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women was hosted in Beijing. The NGO Forum at the
conference popularized the term “NGO” as it inspired NGO organizers and scholars in China
(Ma, 2002, p. 308). Guo Jianmei, who at the time was covering the event for the magazine
Chinese Lawyers, said she was “astounded to see so many people working towards women’s
rights and they were all working in non-governmental organizations, a sector I had never heard
about before” (Liu, 2013). The event inspired her to start a career in the field, and in 1995 she
founded the Women’s Legal Research and Service Centre, later renamed Beijing Zhong Ze
Women’s Legal Consulting and Service Centre. It provides free legal advice for Chinese women
on issues such as land rights and sexual harassment. Chinese authorities announced its closure in
January 2016.
A revival of religions and the rise of people’s economic status has contributed to a rise in
the prevalence of NGOs in China. Philanthropy has been the outlet for many of the growing
number of Buddhists, Daoists, and Christians who desire to do good works (The Economist,
2014a). The increase in population of the wealthy has allowed more people to be able to afford to
11

donate humanitarian causes. The relatively new middle class has also been eager to get involved.
They share the Communist Party’s desire for stability and aspire to participate more in society to
meet society’s needs for services (The Economist, 2014b).
In order to understand more about the state-society relationship in China, it is important
to note the history of NGOs in China. There are distinct eras and milestones in NGO operations
in China that can be studied to discern the Chinese government’s changing attitudes towards
NGOs.
Early History
Between the founding of the PRC in 1949 and the beginning of the reform period under
Deng Xiaoping in 1978, Chinese citizens did not have the freedom of association to establish
NGOs. People relied on the state for their needs and shared resources by means of communes.
However, during this time period between 1949 and 1978, governmentally-organized groups
such as the Red Cross Society of China, the Communist Youth League, and the Chinese
Women’s Federation were established to encourage citizen participation in party causes. These
GONGOs still exist in China today. According to Jennifer Hsu, the key factors that led to the
growth of the NGO sector in China were policy failures and decentralization of the state (Hsu,
2014, p. 100). As a result of disasters under Mao’s rule, such as the famine from the Great Leap
Forward (1959-1961) and the bloodshed from the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Deng
Xiaoping shifted policy focus away from party ideology when he came to power. Deng
advocated for whatever was most practical, which at the time was adopting capitalist reforms.
Beginning in 1978, China pursued a type of capitalism deemed “socialism with Chinese
characteristics,” a term coined by Deng Xiaoping in 1982 in his opening speech at the 12th
National Congress of the CCP (as cited in China Today, n.d.). The term aimed to legitimize the
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continued existence and rule of the Chinese Communist Party amidst these reforms. Deng
initiated the reforms in a cautious manner, what he referred to as “crossing the river while feeling
for stones” (Qin & Wu, 2018). Still, the cracks in the “iron rice bowl” of the work-unit meant
that people were susceptible to unemployment. After Mao, decentralization meant that local
government officials were left to their own devices to handle social issues in their area, which
created a welcoming environment for NGOs on the local level. Once independent organizations
were legalized, grassroots NGOs were able to fill the gap between the services provided by the
state and the needs demanded by society (Ma, 2002, p. 308). Representatives from the Ministry
of Civil Affairs interviewed by Qiusha Ma claimed credit for distributing economic and social
responsibilities to the social groups rather than explaining the shift in state-society relations as an
organic, bottom-up phenomenon (Ma, 2002, p. 306). These NGOs strengthened the Chinese
Community Party because the party could take credit for the NGOs’ positive actions. This
showcases how the CPP is willing to accept technical and humanitarian assistance that reinforces
rather than challenges their rule. This pattern has continued into other eras.
Registration Requirements
The primary way the PRC oversees the work of NGOs is through a registration process
that determines whether or not they can become legal entities in the first place. This process was
established in 1989 when the State Council issued the Regulations on the Registration of Social
Organizations. These regulations were issued in October 1989, almost immediately after the
Tiananmen protests (Hsu & Hasmath, 2014, p. 522). The timing suggests China’s fear of
organized social forces threatening the CCP’s stability. One of the main duties of the Ministry of
Civil Affairs, which was created under the State Council in 1978, was henceforth to manage the
registration of social organizations, foundations, and private non-enterprise units, which are the
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forms of domestic NGOs under Chinese law. The MoCA has the authority to issue warnings,
give orders, and cancel or change the official status of an organization (Hsu & Hasmath, 2014, p.
522). A registered NGO can enjoy tax benefits and funding from the government. Registration
with the Ministry of Civil Affairs can be difficult because up until 2012, every nongovernmental
organization had to first find a government agency sponsor. The requirement of a government
sponsor before official registration is known as the dual management system, and it is one of the
first policies scholars pinpoint when discussing the corporatist strategies that the government
uses to control civil society. The government sponsor must agree to supervise the operations of
the organization before the NGO is eligible to submit its application for a legal status (Liu,
2013).
Many grassroots NGOs cannot or will not find a government agency willing to sponsor
them. One alternative some of these groups have pursued is registering as a business. Businesses
are charged higher tax rates, though (Liu, 2013). Still, Huang Yizhi, a lawyer for the legal
advocacy group Yirenping, says that even if the organization were registered as an NGO, it
would have to “tone down its advocacy” in exchange for the government money it would receive
(The Economist, 2014a). A survey conducted by the Guangdong-based group NGOCN in 2018
reveals that 60 out of the 680 surveyed NGOs across 10 cities in China were not registered
(Broadbent, 2018). The top three reasons the organizations gave for not registering included time
and financial costs being too high, an inability to find a professional supervisory unit, and a fear
about decreased flexibility in their activities after registration. While the survey results do not
capture the views of all NGOs in China, the answers from unregistered organizations can provide
insight into some of the perceived challenges and costs of registration. Many groups have
preferred an ambiguous status because it allows them to sidestep protocol while addressing
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important social equality issues. The legal ambiguity seems to reflect a period when China’s
legal and political structures are in a developmental stage. Proceeding with operations poses risks
and requires a level of sensitivity and flexibility from NGO leaders as authorities assess any
given situation on a case-by-case basis. While inconsistent, the system seemingly works in the
government’s favor by allowing it to legally terminate any behavior the unregistered group
enacts against the best interest of the CCP. On the other hand, an influx of organizations that are
not accounted for could potentially mean the government would not notice “anti-party” activities
until they have rallied considerable support.
Growth and Loosening Policies
In the past decade, the number of NGOs in China has more than doubled (The Economist,
2014a; National Bureau of Statistics, 2019). The growth has in part been spurred by the relief
efforts for the Sichuan earthquake in 2008. Many scholars note the impressive and the
unprecedented engagement of civil society in China that was catalyzed by the 7.9-magnitude
earthquake in this western province of China. Thousands of volunteers went to Sichuan or
donated items in its aftermath. The relief efforts instilled a volunteering spirit in the Chinese
people and showed them how ordinary people could make a difference (Xu, 2014). Analysis of
the subsequent increase in NGOs following the disaster suggests that the Chinese people
recognized the limits of the state’s ability to respond in disaster situations. Bin Xu, Assistant
Professor in the Department of Sociology at Emory University, argues that the earthquake
proved to be a “consensus crisis,” a situation in which people and organizations across different
sectors united to achieve a common goal (Xu, 2014). Before the disaster occurred, there had been
a lack of public understanding of the non-profit sector (Liu, 2013). Furthermore, the disaster
highlighted the differences between state and society as well as between the central state and
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local government. A teacher at Sichuan Academy who had assisted in the earthquake relief
efforts said, “We all saw the NGOs at work and saw that they were much more effective than the
government” (The Economist, 2014a). Xu (2014) notes that informal groups were more prepared
than the GONGOs at delivering the demanded social services in the aftermath (p. 103). This
increased the legitimacy of grassroots NGOs. Thereafter many more people sought to join
existing NGOs or start new ones.
A significant change in policy that simplified NGO registration occurred in 2012 in some
areas of China. Starting in July of that year, NGOs in Guangdong Province could directly
register themselves with the Ministry of Civil Affairs instead of first finding another government
sponsor (Liu, 2013). This lack of a need for a government sponsor became known as the
“Guangdong Model,” but other cities began to adjust their policies as well. In October 2012, the
Civil Affairs Bureau of Wenzhou in eastern Zhejiang Province also lifted its requirement for
government sponsorship of NGOs. Similar local policy changes were also implemented in
Beijing, Shanghai, and Chengdu. Even in these areas, there are still requirements for what types
of NGOs can register.
The loosening in the policy only applies to cultural, economic, social service and
recreational organizations. Thus, human rights organizations remain banned, as do most groups
promoting religious, ethnic or labor rights due to the politically-sensitive nature of these issues.
The gradual liberalization of policy may reflect success of bottom-up influence. Although the
policy change is not necessarily ground-breaking, it may reflect a growing amount of trust
between the government and organizations that seem committed to providing services without
challenging party rule. The elimination of a government sponsor simplifies the registration
process and thus would encourage more organizations to register. It also reduces the
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responsibilities of the government officials. However, as the policy was implemented locally, a
People’s Daily article emphasizes that the “untying” of organizations from supervisory units
should not be interpreted as a relaxation in policy and encourages the various parties involved to
continue to adhere to their responsibilities for social management (China Development Brief,
2012; Zhang, 2012). The removal of the requirement for a professional supervisory unit for
official registration for certain types of organizations may be implemented nationally if it is
included in the final version of Regulations for the Registration Management of Social
Organizations, a draft of which was released to the public for comments in 2018. The law is
meant to consolidate and ultimately replace earlier laws concerning the three types of social
organizations.
Recent Restrictions
Since Xi Jinping’s coming to power in the fall of 2012, there have been many shutdowns,
arrests, and imprisonments related to NGO work. An article in the People’s Daily touts that in
2018, the Ministry of Civil Affairs launched an initiative that cracked down on 5,845 “illegal
organizations” and exposed an additional 300 or more of suspected illegal organizations (Bo,
2019). One of the most notable cases in 2015, which received international attention, was the
month-long detainment of five women’s rights activists who were planning a public awareness
campaign about sexual assault on public transportation. The headquarters of Yirenping in
Beijing, the legal advocacy NGO with which some of the women had close ties, was also raided
during that time period. In fact, some think that the detention of the “Feminist Five” was targeted
more at Yirenping to send them a message (Yuen, 2015, p. 53).
The 2016 Charity Law is the least contentious of China’s recent legislation on NGOs; it
is largely regarded positively for expanding flexibility for charitable activities. It significantly
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lowers barriers for public fundraising, an activity traditionally dominated by GONGOS such as
the Chinese Red Cross and the China Youth Development Foundation (International Center for
Not-for-Profit Law, 2019, p. 6). The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL)
describes the passing of the Charity Law as part of a “watershed moment in the development of
the legal environment for philanthropy and civil society in China” (ICNL, 2018). The 2016
Charity Law details how social organizations can apply for a charitable organization status.
Previously, only a small group of foundations could fundraise publicly, but under the 2016
Charity Law, any social organization that has held charitable organization status for two years
can apply for public fundraising status. The law also addresses online fundraising, the first
attempt to issue standards for it. The inclusion of these standards acknowledges the role social
media has played in popularizing fundraising and empowering individuals and grassroots
organizations to engage in charitable activities (ICNL, 2019, pp. 6-7).
In the spring of 2015, China’s National People’s Congress released a draft of a bill on the
management of foreign NGOs. Its approved form was released in April 2016, and the law, titled
Law on Management of Domestic Activities of Overseas Non-governmental Organizations, came
into effect January 2017. The law not only pertains to the registration process of foreign NGOs
operating in China but also any Chinese NGOs receiving foreign funding. The law declares that
it is only legal for Chinese individuals and organizations to receive funding from non-Chinese
NGOs if the foreign NGO has been registered in China. Numerous Chinese NGOs have reported
that foreign funding has been integral to their continued existence. Some of those without
funding from large NGOs based in other countries have had difficulties sustaining themselves.
Registration used to only be handled through the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but the law makes it
necessary for all foreign NGO registration to be conducted through the Public Security Bureau
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(Minzner et al, 2015). The registration process is cumbersome, and the paperwork and list of
appropriate Chinese government sponsors for the foreign NGOs was not made available until
shortly before the law was scheduled to come into effect. Some scholars wondered if the delay
was intentional, while others assumed it was simply a result of bureaucratic incompetence
(Huang, 2017). As a result, many foreign NGOs felt as though they did not have enough time to
take the required actions, and many domestic organizations will have no choice but to cut off any
connections and partnerships with foreign NGOs. While not directly affecting domestic NGOs,
the Foreign NGO Law reveals the state’s wariness towards the types of funding domestic NGOs
receive, especially considering the role NGOs played in the color revolutions.
While some may praise the increased legislation as a sign of institutionalizing NGOs as a
part of Chinese society, others would argue that it is a form of corporatism to aid the state in
controlling and suppressing NGO growth that could threaten state power. The current legal
environment for NGOs in China shows that the Chinese Communist Party will continue to guide
and supervise the NGO sector.
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Chapter 3: Cases
This chapter describes results gathered on domestic organizations operating in Beijing,
Guangdong, Yunnan, and Gansu. 120 entries listed in China Development Brief’s NGO
directory were cross-referenced with the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ online database of registered
social organizations. To introduce some degree of randomizing, I chose the first 15 and last 15
listed for each of the four province-level divisions. Both websites are dynamic, so the study
captures data that was current at the time of collection.
As described in the first chapter, I selected Beijing, Guangdong, Yunnan, and Gansu
because of their representation in the literature on social management models, their varying
levels of economic development, and their geographic location within China. They are in the
northeast, southeast, southwest, and northwest, respectively. Both Beijing and Guangdong are
significantly more economically developed than Yunnan and Gansu. When comparing 2019 data
of gross domestic product per capita across the 31 provinces and municipalities of Mainland
China (which excludes the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macao), Beijing
ranks first; Guangdong, fifth; Yunnan, 28th; and Gansu, 31st (Textor, 2021). Although literature
on NGOs in Gansu is less common compared to the other three locations, I chose it because it is
one of the least economically developed provinces in China, and I wanted to compare my
findings with those on Yunnan, which also has low economic development.
At the time of data collection, when the filters were applied in CDB’s NGO directory,
there were 360 entries for Beijing, 264 for Guangdong, 37 for Yunnan, and 41 for Gansu. Only
30 organizations were chosen per location; this is largely based on the constraint of the region
with the lowest number of entries, Yunnan. China Development Brief is based in Beijing, so its
high number of organizations is likely due to the platform being much more well-known there.
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Figure 3.1 shows the four geographic locations of the operations of organizations chosen for this
study.

Figure 3.1. Map of Organizations' Location of Operations

Overall Results
The entries in China Development Brief’s NGO Directory allow organizations to display
one or more issue areas from a list of prescribed categories. Other standard parts of the entries
include the organization’s founding year, size, and location of operations. Most organizations list
multiple issue areas, so to better compare results, for each organization I chose one primary issue
area or created my own category based on my interpretation of the organization’s main mission
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focus. This involved reading the (Chinese) description the organization provided about itself and,
if it is registered in the MoCA database, the description provided there.
The process was most straightforward for organizations that have an intuitive name, only
one listed issue area, and a thorough description of its activities. In the case of Meizhou Autism
Support Society in Guangdong, for example, the organization has listed only one issue area,
“Disabilities” (残障), and the details provided in both China Development Brief and the MoCA
database consistently describe its activities as providing support services to the autistic
community, including psychological counseling, and promoting their schooling, employment,
and acceptance of government and community assistance. Therefore, I coded the organization’s
primary issue area as disability support without any qualms.
I quickly learned that it was important to examine the organization’s description in
addition to the listed issue area, even if only one issue area is listed, because there are instances
in which the issue areas do not appear to correspond with the organizations’ actual focus. For
example, China Charities Aid Foundation for Children in Beijing lists “Elderly” (老人) as its
issue area. The organization’s name contradicts that information, and so does the provided
description, where it discusses providing medical and technical support for children who are
otherwise uncared for, including orphans, runaway children, and school dropouts. Therefore,
assuming the entry included erroneous information, I coded the organization’s primary issue area
as children’s services.
Some organizations did not provide much information to China Development Brief, and
the information the directory does display is not particularly indicative of a primary issue area.
Two out of the 120 organizations’ entries do not have an issue area listed in China Development
Brief; that part of their table of basic facts is blank. One organization that has a blank in the issue
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area category is Friends of Park in Guangdong, whose full Chinese name could be translated to
“Shenzhen’s Futian District Park Friends City Management Service Center.” The organization
describes itself as China’s first social organization to focus on the quality and management of
public parks. Based on this description, I ultimately chose to code this organization’s primary
issue area as environmental protection.
The other entry that lacks specification of an issue area belongs to Beijing Human and
Animals Environmental Education Center. The entry also lacks a description or a link to a
website for any additional information. Based on their name alone, I had originally planned to
code the organization with a primary issue area of environmental protection, rationalizing that its
name implies a focus on preserving wildlife. Upon cross-referencing the organization in MoCA’s
database, however, I found a brief description of its activities there— “develop prevention of
diseases shared between humans and domestic animals; popularize scientific knowledge on
urban environmental protection and animal immunity; host scientific exchanges on related
topics.”2 Based on this description in the MoCA database, I chose to code the organization’s
primary issue area as public health instead. While I could have coded it as education or created a
new category of epidemiology, the former would have been too broad, and the latter would have
been too narrow for comparison across other issue areas and regions.
While each organization is unique, to be able to make comparisons across an issue area or
region, I did not create a particularly niche issue area category for an organization unless I
deemed that the essence of the organization’s focus would be lost in a broader category. For
example, the issue areas listed in Fengling Nonprofit Family Photos’ entry are “Elderly” and
“Other.” According to the provided description, Fengling is comprised of a group of university

Original Chinese text: “开展预防家养动物人畜共患病，城市环保以及动物免疫知识的科学普及，举办与之
相关的科技交流”
2
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students who take free photos for people living in impoverished mountainous regions of Yunnan.
The perceived need for such an organization is likely linked to China’s aging population and the
trend of many family members working or studying in urban areas only returning to visit their
rural hometowns once a year during Chinese New Year. I chose to code this organization with
the primary issue area of photography in order to highlight the unique mission.
Another example of an organization with a more niche issue area is Shenzhen Longyue
Charitable Foundation, which serves veterans and specializes in repatriating veterans’ remains.
Its description touts that it is “currently China’s only legally registered charitable non-profit
foundation that specializes in serving veterans of the War of Resistance Against Japan.”3 While
the issue area of “Elderly” listed in its China Development Brief entry is not ill-fitting, I decided
it would be best to highlight the more specific mission set of veterans’ services and code it as
such.
My coding process produced a total of 20 primary issue areas. I do not attempt to make
sweeping claims about certain sectors over others based on my findings because, as portrayed in
the examples, categorizing the organizations is a subjective process, and there is much variation
between the organizations within the same category. The issue areas could be combined into
fewer categories, but as described above, one would risk losing sight of the unique mission set of
certain organizations. Figure 3.2 below provides an overview of the number of organizations in
each issue area and in each region.

3

Original Chinese text: “目前国内唯一合法注册的专注于服务抗战老兵的非公募慈善基金会”
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Figure 3.2. Issue Areas and Locations of Organizations

The top three issue areas in my study were social work, environmental protection, and
disability support. The organizations I coded as having a primary issue area of social work tend
to include the term “social work” (社会工作, or its abbreviation, 社工) in their names and
describe themselves as serving multiple demographics, including combinations of groups such as
the elderly, children, migrant laborers, people with disabilities, and victims of domestic violence.
Even for organizations that did not include “social work” in their name, I coded their primary
issue area as such if they described a similarly broad range of services in their communities,
which brought the total of social work organizations to 18. The 16 organizations dedicated to
environmental protection varied in their specific mission areas, including addressing
desertification, protecting wildlife, promoting environmentalism and sustainable development
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among women, and conserving water and energy. Disability support was not far behind with 15
organizations with specializations ranging from autism to hearing impairment. There was not
significant variation between regions on the number of organizations dedicated to social work,
environmental protection, or disability support, but Yunnan had only one organization dedicated
to disability support.
Analysis of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Most, but not all, of the organizations in China Development
Brief’s NGO Directory will be able to be found in the Ministry of Civil Affairs
database.
Over 70% of the organizations in my sample are registered in the MoCA database, which
supports the first hypothesis that the majority of the organizations would be found there. Figure
3.3 below gives the breakdown of the 120 organizations’ presence or lack thereof in the
database, and Table 3.1 lists the issue areas and locations of the unregistered organizations.

Registration in MoCA Database

Unregistered

28%
53%

Registered- without
supervisory unit

19%

Registered- with
supervisory unit

Figure 3.3. Registration in MoCA Database
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Unregistered organizations
34 of the 120 organizations were not found to be registered in the Ministry of Civil
Affairs database. Other studies have explained why certain groups may choose not to register. A
survey conducted by the Guangdong-based group NGOCN in 2018 reveals that 60 out of the 680
surveyed NGOs across 10 cities in China were not registered (Broadbent, 2018). As shown in the
graph below (Figure 3.4) from a translated summary of the report, the top three reasons the
organizations gave for not registering included time and financial costs being too high, an
inability to find a professional supervisory unit, and a fear about decreased flexibility in their
activities after registration (Broadbent, 2018). While the survey results do not capture the views
of all NGOs in China, the answers from unregistered organizations can provide insight into some
of the perceived challenges and costs of registration.

Figure 3.4. NGOCN’s Survey Results on Why Organizations Had Not Registered

(Broadbent, 2018)

This does not necessarily mean that the unregistered NGOs are violating registration
policy; rather, upon further inspection, one can see that at least some of the organizations likely
do not meet the criteria to need to registration under the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Some of these
27

groups within my dataset of 120 organizations note affiliation with a university, such as
Yunnan’s Environmental and Biological Diversity Legal Clinic with Southwest Forestry
University and Vermont Law School, Gansu’s Yishan Yishui Center for Environmental and
Social Development Center with Lanzhou University, and Gansu Agricultural University Yirun
Longyuan Public Welfare Team. Additionally, Yunnan’s Zhaotong Environmental Protection
Volunteers Society notes association with the Communist Youth League, a Chinese Communist
Party organization for Chinese youth between 14 and 28 years old.
Some unregistered organizations are online platforms rather than actual organizations,
such as Yunnan’s Green Geography Cooperative Network, Guangdong’s Love Oxygen Star
Internet Public Welfare Dissemination Platform, Beijing’s Aibai Cultural Education Center, and
Gansu’s Wennuannuan Public Welfare. There are also some groups that are for-profit entities
that entered themselves into the NGO directory because they offer workshops or free services to
NGOs, such as Yunnan’s China Travel Volunteer Education Support Group and Gansu Golden
Fruit Agriculture and Forestry Production and Marketing Cooperative. These explanations can be
found directly within the descriptions provided by the organizations in China Development
Brief’s directory.
The remainder that did not provide clues in their organization description could be
operating in a legal gray area. Many scholars have found that NGOs operating in China identify
interactions with local governments as being the key to success. This is how the contingent
approach to studying civil society developed. Hsu and Hasmath (2014) use the term “tacit
sanctioning” to describe how local authorities continue have adapted corporatist strategies in
order to engage with NGOs more effectively (p. 530). This observation corresponds with that of
Anthony Spires, who coined the term “mutual symbiosis” primarily to describe the
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interdependency of the government and unregistered, grassroots NGOs. While increased pressure
from the central government in the future could curtail actions of China’s NGOs, the following
examples showcase ways in which NGOs have maintained a positive relationship with the
government in recent years.
Previous research has shown that local governments have not necessarily been opposed to
working with unregistered organizations to mitigate problems. When local governments are
under a lot of pressure to handle an issue, they may seek alternatives for solving problems. This
was the case for two cities in Guangdong Province studied by Anthony Spires that had high rates
of HIV/AIDs (Spires, 2011). One city government sought after an unregistered organization that
specialized in LGBT issues. A city government’s Center for Disease Control invited the
unregistered NGO to bring in volunteers and educate them on HIV/AIDS, and they were even
able to run a media campaign to educate the public. A neighboring city also contacted the
organization about collaborating on an HIV testing center for the LGBT community (Spires,
2011, p. 16). The level of connections an unregistered NGO has with members of the local
government could mean they would not need to expect severe ramifications for skirting protocol,
especially if the expertise and services of the NGO are in high demand and benefit the
government.
There were only three issue areas not represented in the unregistered organizations of this
study—children’s services, disability support, and veterans’ services. With these issue areas all
serving particularly vulnerable populations, the organizations likely did not have any trouble
gaining government approval and support. The author-generated Table 3.1 below summarizes
the primary issue area and region for all of the organizations not found in the Ministry of Civil
Affairs database.
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Table 3.1 Organizations Not Registered in MoCA Database

Row Labels
Unregistered
Business Support
Charity Platform
Cultural Preservation
Education
Environmental Protection
LGBT
Migrant Labor Education
Migrant Labor Rights
NGO support
Photography
Poverty Alleviation
Public Health
Rural Development
Rural Education
Safety Education
Social Work
Support for Migrant Laborers' Children
Grand Total

Beijing

Gansu
10
1
1
2
2
1

8
1
1
2
2

1
1

1
1

1

10

30

8

Guangdong Yunnan
Grand Total
5
11
34
1
2
1
3
3
4
4
1
2
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
5
11
34

Hypothesis 2: Organizations specializing in more sensitive issues (LGBT+ issues,
migrant labor rights, left-behind children) might be listed in the CDB directory
but not in the MoCA database.
As shown in the table above, unregistered organizations within the dataset represent a
wide range of issue areas, and several of those dealing with what one might deem as sensitive
subjects were registered in the MoCA database. This contradicts the second hypothesis that states
organizations specializing in more sensitive issues might be listed in the CDB directory but not
in the MoCA database, which is worthy of further consideration.
LGBT+ Issues
Of the two organizations under review that focus on LGBT+ issues, one of them is
registered, and one is not. The one that is not, Aibai Culture and Education Center, is a media
platform for Q&A, blog posts, and educational videos. Their website has an Internet Content
Provider (ICP) license number noted at the bottom of its webpages.4 The Chinese Ministry of
Industry and Information issues these permits for China-based websites to legally operate in
China. For these registration systems to exist shows that China is committed to ensuring the
services and content available to its people are accountable to the government and
institutionalized for optimal control and censorship. The uncensored nature of the website and
other LGBT+ organizations suggest the issue areas themselves are not necessarily sensitive.
Rather, it may be more sensitive when combined with criticism of China’s HIV/AIDS epidemic
response or with society’s values of carrying on the family’s name and the associated pressure
under China’s planned birth policies.

4

Web address: https://www.aibai.cn/
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Migrant Labor Rights
Seven organizations primarily dealt with the issue of migrant labor in some form,
whether with the laborers themselves or with the families they brought with them or left behind.
China’s migrant population tends to consist of people from rural areas who leave their hometown
to find employment in cities despite their inability to obtain an urban hukou （户口）that would
grant them access to public services.5 The government values NGOs that “cope with people such
as migrant families, who are not always popular in cities where public services are under strain”
(The Economist, 2014c). Of the two organizations dedicated specifically to legal counsel for
migrant laborers, only one of them, Beijing Zhicheng Migrant Workers Legal Aid and Research
Center, is registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The other one, Shenzhen Chunfeng Labor
Disputes Services Center, states in its description that it is registered as a business with the
Ministry of Commerce. It also states that its primarily receives financial support from an
American international labor rights foundation.
In China no labor unions can exist outside of All-China Federation of Labor Unions.
NGOs have formed to fill in the gap and act as labor unions would. Anthony Spires reports that
an NGO focusing on injuries at the workplace was told to leave the area when a factory owner
complained to the local government about the NGO’s work. However, instead of penalizing the
NGO, the local health department officials helped the group find a new location close by because
the health department has fewer issues when the NGO helps lower the incidence of work injuries
(Spires, 2011, p. 33). Other labor NGOs in the Pearl River Delta inform workers of their rights
and help them acquire the skills needed to negotiate with their superiors. This has been to the

Hukou is the name for China’s household registration system designed in the late 1950s to control internal
migration. It acts as an internal passport and officially designates whether someone has an “agricultural” or “nonagricultural” status. The hukou determines where one is eligible to receive social welfare benefits and access to
public resources such as education for one’s children.
5
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benefit of employers because such bargaining helps reduce work stoppages and strikes (Froissart,
2011, p. 24).
Zeng Feiyang runs an NGO from Guangzhou called the Panyu Migrant Workers’ Service
Center. His organization defends the rights of migrant workers coming into the Pearl River Delta
region. The NGO’s goals are “to research migrant workers’ rights, to provide legal aid for
migrant workers, to strengthen migrant workers awareness of the use of the law to protect rights,
to foster migrant workers’ identities as citizens with ideals, values, culture, and responsibility, to
promote the development of migrant workers’ rights protection” (China Development Brief,
2015). Zeng Feiyang has experienced firsthand the 2012 changes in NGO registration policy. For
more than a decade, Zeng had been harassed by the government for his work. He was evicted
from his work headquarters and had his utilities cut off at his house. But then in the fall of 2013,
Zeng got a call from one of the local officials who used to harass him. This time the call was to
ask Zeng if he wanted to register the NGO. This change in attitude towards a labor group “whose
activities would once have been seen as unquestionably subversive” suggests the government is
interested in finding new ways to handle controversial advocacy groups in order to help address
social concerns or at the very least to be able to supervise their work in a less antagonizing
manner (The Economist, 2014a).
Registration Comparisons by Location
Hypothesis 3: Provinces with more developed economies (Beijing and
Guangdong) will have a lower proportion of organizations listed in the Ministry
of Civil Affairs database.
There is not significant support for the third hypothesis. While Guangdong did have the
lowest proportion of registered organizations, Beijing was close to having the most. This could
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be due to the popularity of China Development Brief in Beijing and the variety of groups that
advertise themselves there despite not falling under the category of needing to be registered with
the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The chart below compares registration by location. Yunnan had the
most unregistered organizations, which does not support the hypothesis. One of them is a shop
selling local handicrafts. Its registration information was not found in the MoCA database, but it
could be registered as a business. It likely provided its information to China Development Brief
due to the humanitarian nature of the project promoting the economic well-being of lower
income groups.
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8

Registered- without supervisory unit

7
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15
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24
10
13
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Beijing

Gansu

12

5

0
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Figure 3.5. MoCA Registration by Location
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Hypothesis 4: Due to lower levels of economic development, Yunnan and Gansu
will have a higher number of organizations dedicated to poverty alleviation and
education than Beijing and Guangdong.
“Poverty alleviation” and “education” ended up being too broad of terms for categorizing
the organizations for this study. There were many types of organizations that encompass these
overall goals across all four locations. Migrant laborers and their children in Beijing and
Guangdong accounted for the target of a few of the organizations geared towards education. Two
organizations in Beijing, Dongcheng District Youthful Dreams Youth Cooperative Association
and Gongming Social Work Development Center, and one organization in Guangdong,
Shenzhen Fresh Grass Workmate Growth Service Department, focus on the integration of
migrant laborers into society and the workplace. Beijing’s Dongcheng District Youthful Dreams
Youth Cooperative Association has university student volunteers assist and converse with young
migrant workers in the hopes of helping the migrant workers better adjust to urban life. NGO
work in this issue area seeks to alleviate problems associated with the stark urban-rural gap that
has widened with China’s rapid economic growth. It also shows that the urban-rural gap in
access to education and other resources is not necessarily confined to the physical location of
these areas within China. Each province contains both urban and rural areas with varying levels
of economic development, and there is demand for poverty alleviation and educational services
in even the most well-developed cities, especially as they pertain to the migrant labor force.
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Chapter 4: Examining Enpai
China’s NGO sector has not developed in isolation. Many organizations owe their
success to larger support organizations such as Enpai Public Welfare, a Chinese non-profit
organization that specializes in providing resources and training on social innovation to Chinese
NGOs and social enterprises. In this chapter I continue to analyze state-society relations, albeit
from a slightly different angle of non-profit incubators by conducting a case study of Enpai
Public Welfare. I examine the role that Enpai plays in NGO development in China through
analysis of online resources as well as my own internship experience.
I interned at Nanjing Enpai Non-Profit Organization Development Center, hereafter
referred to as NPI Nanjing, from March to June of 2017 while studying abroad to fulfill the
Chinese Capstone Flagship Overseas Center’s internship requirement.6 While I had considered
interning for China Development Brief where I could assist in translating Chinese articles on the
NGO sector into Chinese, I opted to accept an internship that would allow me to observe the
developments firsthand. I used China Development Brief’s NGO job search engine to locate
suitable internship openings. Interning at Enpai was ideal for me because, as an intermediary
organization for other NGOs, it gave me the opportunity to observe multiple organizations and
issue areas rather than only one. It also allowed me to observe NGOs’ interactions with local
government bodies since NPI serves as a bridge between smaller, newer organizations and
government bodies such as the Ministry of Civil Affairs.
Enpai Public Welfare is most often referred to as simply Enpai or NPI, standing for the
generic English term “Non-Profit Incubator” due to its popular incubation program for newly-

6

To learn more about the program, visit https://www.americancouncils.org/programs/chinese-overseas-flagship
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formed Chinese NGOs and social enterprises. The Mandarin name “Enpai” （恩派）is loosely
based on the English pronunciation of the letters “N-P-I” while evoking “kindness, mercy,
charity” and “school of thought, sect, branch” based on the meaning of the characters 恩 and 派,
respectively. Just as the organization is referred to in China, I use the shortened names Enpai and
NPI interchangeably to refer to the organization as a whole, and I add on the city name when
referring to a branch in a particular location.
According to its website, NPI has incubated more than 1,000 social organizations and
social enterprises in China since its founding by Zhao Lyu（吕朝）in 2006. It has supported
over 3,000 organizations through its other programs. The organizations and professionals that
undergo NPI’s training programs focus on a wide variety of issues, including elderly care,
education, environmental protection, youth development, poverty alleviation, disability support,
residential community services, social work, and more. NPI’s newest location was established in
Sanya, Hainan Province in 2020, while its oldest location is its headquarters in Shanghai (NPI,
n.d.).
Enpai in China Development Brief and the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ Databases
While not appearing within the 120 organizations of my dataset, NPI is searchable in
both China Development Brief’s NGO directory and in the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ database of
registered social organizations. Searching for “恩派” (Enpai) as key words with no other filters
applied in China Development Brief’s NGO directory yields eight results with names tied to six
different locations—Wuhan (Hubei Province), Beijing, Zhuhai (Guangdong Province), Shenzhen
(Guangdong Province), Hefei (Anhui Province), and Shanghai; two entries did not specify a
location within their names. The two unspecified locations are general entries, one for Enpai
Non-Profit Organization Development Center as a whole, and the other for Enpai Social
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Entrepreneurship Platform. The entry for Shanghai, Shanghai Enpai Public Welfare Foundation,
also notes that it has programs in a total of 45 cities, including Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, and
Guangzhou. The listed issue areas for these entries in China Development Brief are “Social
innovation/ social entrepreneurship, capacity building/ research/ support/ consulting.” Had one or
more of Enpai’s entries appeared in my dataset, I would have coded them as having a primary
issue area of NGO support.
For being such a prominent organization in China, there is no wonder that it is formally
registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs as well. Searching for “恩派” in the MoCA database
of registered social organizations produces 20 results across 17 cities and 14 provinces and
municipalities. Every China Development Brief entry can be found in the MoCA database,
which supports my suspected findings that most organizations in China Development Brief’s
directory would be in the MoCA database of registered organizations. In fact, more NPI
locations can be found in MoCA’s database than there are listed on China Development Brief.
This could suggest NPI prioritizes official registration and a positive relationship with the
government. It also suggests NPI does not rely heavily on China Development Brief for
promotion of its locations and brand. There are four registered offices in Guangdong province,
two in Beijing, and two in Shanghai, while there is only one office listed in each of the other
provinces. The higher number of offices in these most economically developed locations
suggests a greater popular demand for incubators in these places. The number of NPI’s registered
offices will likely grow as its presence in other cities transitions to the formation of permanent
offices.
Figure 4.1, a screenshot from a dynamic graphic on NPI’s website, depicts its reach
across China. The arrows from its headquarters in Shanghai on the east coast go north as far as
38

Beijing, Tianjin, and Dalian (Liaoning Province); as far west as Chengdu (Sichuan Province) and
Kunming (Yunnan Province); and as far south as Guangdong Province, where there are multiple
overlapping dots representing the offices in Dongguan, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Zhuhai.

Figure 4.1. NPI.org.cn Depiction of Its Branches

(NPI, n.d.)
Enpai’s Early History
NPI’s growth and success is due in part to timing and the demands they were able to meet
with their services. NPI founder Zhao Lyu graduated from Peking University’s Chinese
Language Department and worked as a journalist for Xinhua News before becoming the chief
editor for Charity Times. Around the time that he and his friend Yusheng Shan discussed
creating an incubator specifically to support non-profit organizations, the local Ministry of Civil
Affairs office had also been wanting a way to promote the development of social organizations
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in the New Pudong District of Shanghai. Zhao Lyu met with Yili Ma, the head of Pudong New
District’s Civil Affairs Bureau at the end of 2005, and by January 2006, the brand that is now
known as Enpai had officially registered itself as Shanghai Pudong Nonprofit Organization
Development Center, a civil non-enterprise unit with the Pudong New District Civil Affairs
Bureau as its supervisory unit (Ju, 2017).
As stated by Hua Ju of Peking University’s School of Government, at a time when
barriers to registration were quite high for registration, NPI’s early success was made possible
through the trust of Pudong New District Civil Affairs Bureau (Ju, 2017). Lyu himself admits
that these personal relationships are necessary for success, although he says it is not much
different than in the business world (Wang, 2011). While personal connections directly
influencing success is not a phenomenon unique to China, this guanxi is crucial in an
environment where one cannot establish and operate an organization without the support of the
local government. The system of social networks and influential relationships for conducting
business in China has its own term because it is so critical for success, and it is no different in the
NGO sector.
In an interview with China Development Brief, NPI Vice President Li Ding explains how
the programs NPI offered were shaped by changing government policies. NPI foresaw that more
people would want to start NGOs with the introduction of loosening registration policy that
waived the requirement for a government supervisory unity. This corresponded with the start of
NPI’s incubation programs to aid these new NGO leaders. NPI later shifted their services with
falling demand as policies and government attitudes changed:
After the 2016 Charity Law came out however, there was an internal government
document that in a sense reintroduced the dual management system in most
places. This means that at least in the major cities like Beijing and Shanghai
registering a new NGO will become more difficult. The government has also
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stopped providing as much support for incubator programs, because many
government agencies believe that there already are enough NGOs. This is why we
are putting more emphasis on community development. In 2016 we found that
there was very low growth rate for new NGOs, and the Overseas NGO Law also
shifted things to some extent. We realized that the market for our services was no
longer large enough, so since 2016 the incubator program in Shanghai shifted
towards social enterprises, and last August we decided that the NPI Social
Venture Fund would also shift towards community services. (China Development
Brief, 2019)
NPI leverages its strong grasp of market-driven entrepreneurship and its well-established
network with various foundations, companies, and other organizations to coach non-profit
organizations and grant them access to applicable best practices and funding resources and
professionalizing China’s non-profit sector. Non-profit incubators in its generic form are not
unique to China, but they are less common worldwide than business incubators for startups and
entrepreneurs (Draper University, 2020). Other organizations in China have since replicated
NPI’s incubation model, but NPI remains the most well-known.
Enpai’s Global Partnerships
Enpai’s recognition is not limited to the domestic non-profit sector, either. NPI has
served as a critical partner for international NGOs and companies operating in China. In an
environment where registered domestic partner organizations are necessary for legal operations,
foreign organizations are likely indebted to NPI and will continue to seek it out for access to
China’s non-profit sector. These connections include those with TechSoup Asia Pacific, which
partners with NPI to provide technology tools and philanthropic services to local civil society
organizations. Deutsche Bank Asia Pacific once “partnered with NPI to support capacity
building for eight start-up sports-related NGOs in Beijing and Shanghai” (Deutsche Bank, 2018).
NPI also benefits from various international connections. NPI is a member of the Global
Social Entrepreneurship Network, which allows it to better communicate with and learn from
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similar organizations across the globe— “We gather organisations supporting social
entrepreneurs around the world to improve the reach, quality and sustainability of their work”
(Global Social Entrepreneurship Network, n.d.). NPI also participates in the SEFORÏS project, a
research project funded by the European Commission that examines how social enterprises
reform societies across the globe (SEFORÏS). NPI is a member of Devex, a media platform that
provides recruiting and business development services for the global development community
(Devex). NPI is also a member of Asian Venture Philanthropy Network, a platform connecting a
“global network of social investors from a diverse range of sectors — all interested in deploying
resources more strategically and collaboratively” (Asian Venture Philanthropy Network, n.d.).
The networking opportunities and even just the descriptions of its members through these
platforms all elevate NPI’s status and increase its capacity to serve and expand social
development in China.
Through a partnership with JP Morgan, NPI created the Kunpeng Social Enterprise
Accelerator Program. The naming of the program was deliberate; Kunpeng refers to an enormous
magical bird in Chinese mythology that transforms from a giant fish. The mystical grandeur
connotated by the program’s name contrasts against the imagery of an unhatched egg associated
with NPI’s incubation program for early-stage grassroots organizations. In fact, only more
advanced social enterprises are eligible to apply for the Kunpeng program. JP Morgan China
describes this program as follows:
Through the program, leaders from more than two dozen SEs [social enterprises]
will attend workshops, training sessions and networking events to help them
develop and carry out their growth plans. The selected SEs are primarily from
Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, Chengdu and neighboring cities, and have mature
business models in place. Their plans cover sectors including education,
healthcare, employment, environmental protection and services for the disabled.
The 27 SEs were selected from 80 applicants. They will receive business training
and access to capital. Upon program completion, the SEs will present their growth
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plans to a group of interested investors, foundations, potential customers and
partners, as an opportunity to pitch and obtain their needed capital. (JP Morgan,
2015)
It is unsurprising that the applications were sought primarily from Shanghai, Beijing,
Shenzhen (Guangdong Province), and Chengdu (Sichuan Province). The four urban locations all
have permanent NPI offices, and the cities have experienced high economic growth and
development and are thus more likely to contain social entrepreneurs with mature business
models due to the level of resources available to them.
Open job positions at NPI can be found listed not only on China Development Brief, but
also on LinkedIn and various Chinese job search websites, including NGO-specific ones,
including Dajie.com, 51jobs.com, Shixiseng.com, Jobui.com, Cnshan.org, and Gongyi.qq.com.7
NPI also contains descriptions on Chinese platforms such as The Effective Philanthropy
Multiplier, BottleDream, NGO 2.0, and China Charity, and it maintains profiles on popular
Chinese social media platforms Weibo and WeChat.
“The Future of Non-Profit Incubators”
The article “The Future of Non-Profit Incubators” in NPI’s Social Entrepreneurs
magazine is primarily a transcribed interview of NPI founder Zhao Lyu. The English quotes are
my own translations of the Chinese source. In this article, Zhao Lyu reflects on the sudden
increased popularity of non-profit incubators in China since his founding of NPI seven years
prior. Lyu notes that in Shanghai alone, there are 17 self-proclaimed incubators （孵化器）. He
warns that an organization cannot call itself an incubator if all it provides is a physical workspace
and equipment without other services (Lyu, 2013).

7

Including Dajie.com, 51jobs.com, Shixiseng.com, Jobui.com, Cnshan.org, Gongyi.qq.com
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In response to a question on how incubators’ capacity-building “software” (intangible
services) can be improved to be more useful, Lyu admonishes incubators for all too often
centering their training sessions for grassroots organizations around lofty ideals rather than their
current reality, which likely includes resource shortages. He encourages incubators to meet these
start-up organizations where they are so that the trainings are not just full of “good” content but
also practical takeaways for the audience to implement in their current, less-than-ideal
circumstances. Perhaps ironically, this is the type of complaint that incubatees during my
internship at NPI Nanjing had for an NPI-sponsored training workshop they attended.
Lyu also observes that while the overall survival conditions for social organizations have
improved, there is also inequality in their experiences. Lyu notes that places everywhere are
“heavy on purchasing services and light on cultivating organizations,” criticizing the fact that
“everyone wants to pick fruit, but no one is willing to plant trees.” He points to the “evidence”
that “the greatest fundraising challenge for Enpai’s own non-profit incubator is for the startup
capital for new grassroorts organizations” (Lyu, 2013). This statement appears to be criticism of
local government bodies or other groups for choosing services provided by a few wellestablished NGOs and social enterprises rather than investing in the development of nascent
grassroots organizations.
Lyu is also asked how he views the efficacy of incubation when there are some
organizations that, upon “hatching” from the program, fail to win government contracts or even
to officially register as a social organization with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Lyu responds by
explaining how success should not be defined so narrowly:
The most important thing for social entrepreneurs entering into an incubation program is
to use this relatively ‘warm’ environment to think through ‘why do we need to do this?’
and to start thinking about ‘how do we do this?’, while also accumulating their capacity,
knowledge, and contacts. Whether or not they can register? Whether or not they can
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receive government money? These are all secondary priorities. Some organizations go
through incubation and find out their programs are not actually suitable for government
contracts, or they find out they’re not even suitable for registering to become a social
organization as defined by MoCA. These are valuable takeaways too, and they don’t
necessarily mean that there is no space in which to survive and grow. But it does mean
that your road to development in that environment will be much more difficult, so will
you still want to push on? That is quite the trial.
Enpai and outside corporations and foundations still have lots of other programs. We
hope to connect social entrepreneurs with a greater variety of resources, not just the
government; that is an important direction we are striving towards. (Lyu, 2013)
Notably, the founder of NPI is offering hope to organizations that are struggling to
receive funding or approval for registration from the government. While he doesn’t deny the
challenges that type of situation presents, he does argue that there is still value in those
organizations. By not only advocating for but providing the necessary network to alternative
sources of funding, NPI is, arguably, taking a stand against the Chinese government’s priorities
as it revolutionizes social entrepreneurship in China.
NPI Nanjing
NPI established an incubation program in the Nanjing’s Yuhuatai District in March of
2012. In September 2016, the district-level Civil Affairs Bureau created the Yuhua Public
Interest Makerspace, a shared office space for promoting the development of social
organizations. NPI Nanjing has been responsible for operating the incubation program there.
There are also programs run by other organizations in the shared space of around 1,000 square
meters (over 10,700 square feet). Yuhua Public Interest Makerspace’s official Wechat account
advertises its “five main functions”—Party-Strengthening Services, Internet+ Services, Program
Purchasing, Training and Cultivation, and Creative Culture (Yuhua Public Interest Makerspace,
n.d.).8

8

Wechat is an app developed by Tencent in 2011. It is a platform for instant messaging, social media, mobile
payments, and more; it can and is used for many facets of daily life in China, both personally and professionally.
Account holders can publish articles and blogs through the app for others to share, a feature I reference in this study.
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“Party-strengthening services” （党建服务）align with the General Office of the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party’s issued requirement in 2015 for all social
organizations to establish Party groups (Li, 2015; Xinhua, 2015). In further guidance outlined by
Opinions on Strengthening the Party Establishment in Social Organizations, the Central
Committee explains the guiding role the Party needs to play in China’s growing number of social
organizations:
Chinese social organizations have rapidly developed in pace with the continued
deepening of the economic reforms of the Deng Xiaoping era. Already they are a
major force in the socialist modernization drive and an important front for the
work of the Party and the masses. Social organizations undertake an important
task in coordinating the comprehensive promotion of construction of a moderately
prosperous society, deepened reformed, rule of law, and a strategic layout of strict
management of the Party. Yet at the same time social organizations are
developing on their own, they are faced with many new situations, problems, and
challenges. An aim of strengthening Party-building work within social
organizations is guiding social organizations in the proper direction to stimulate
the vitality of social organizations and promote social organizations to play a
better part in modernizing the state governance structure and capacity. An
additional aim is bringing social organizations and their staff in tight solidarity
with the Party, to constantly expand the Party's influence in social organizations
and strengthen the Party's class foundation, expand its foundation amongst the
people, and consolidating its base within the rulers. All of this work is of great
significance.
(China Law Translate, 2015)
When my NPI Nanjing supervisor was first showing me around Yuhuatai Public
Interest Makerspace, he explained that I was welcome to sit in on any workshops hosted
in the building. When we approached a sign above a doorway stating “PartyStrengthening Services Area,” my supervisor lightheartedly yet awkwardly explained in
Mandarin that I would likely not be welcome to attend any CCP meetings that are held in
the building. Even though I had lots of questions, I quickly assured him that I understood

For more information on the various functions of Wechat, see: https://signal.supchina.com/what-is-wechat-thesuper-app-you-cant-live-without-in-china/
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and needed no further explanation for his implied warning that Party meetings were offlimits to a non-Chinese citizen. It should be noted that I was the first non-Chinese
employee at Yuhua Public Interest Makerspace. I met one of the only other non-Chinese
employees of NPI when I briefly visited the headquarters in Shanghai. He was an
American citizen who worked in the social enterprise side of NPI’s services.
Another resource advertised in Yuhua Public Interest Makerspace is “Internet Plus,” a
way of promoting innovation and ultimately social and economic development by integrating the
internet into other products and services—in this case, to social organizations’ activities. The
term “Internet+” (互联网+，“互联网加”) was coined by Premier Li Keqiang in 2015 and
became popularized following the issuance of Guiding Opinions of the State Council on
Vigorously Advancing the “Internet Plus” Action (The State Council, 2015; Law Info China,
2015). The Makerspace’s Wechat account states in Chinese that the Internet Plus services
provide the following:
Gathers the city’s “Internet+ Public Welfare” social organizations; promoting the
‘Internet+’ line of thinking and philosophy; constructing the highlands for public
welfare program research and development; guiding pilot web platforms at Yuhua
for public welfare crowdfunding, volunteer services, public welfare program
monitoring, community administration, and more.
(Yuhua Public Interest Makerspace, n.d.)
The Makerspace also boasts a “Creative Culture” with its “coffice space” setup
mimicking a Wi-Fi-equipped coffee shop in which non-profit professionals can mingle and work
on laptops without only being confined to the enclosed office spaces down the hall. In reality,
though, the kitchen with barstools at the counter and the colorful soft seating around small tables,
while pristine, are mostly left unused. A co-worker explained to me that they don’t enjoy coffee
or tea out in the kitchen area very often because of how often government officials pass through.
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The photos (Figure 4.2 below) from the Makerspace’s Wechat account depict the layout of the
coffice area (left) and the multipurpose classroom (right).

Figure 4.2. Scenes from within Yuhua Public Interest Makerspace

(Yuhua Public Interest Makerspace, n.d.)

The ways the different available spaces are used may be attributed to generational
differences as it pertains to preferences and norms in work culture. NPI founder Zhao Lyu
explains that generational differences extend into how NGO leaders have tackled social
problems:
We’ve discovered that there are some really well-educated and experienced young
people working in philanthropic organizations. Their ideas really differ from
those of traditional NGOs. Traditional NGOs target disadvantaged groups and as
such respond to various social problems. However, these social problems aren’t
necessarily the problems of disadvantaged groups, but rather they can also be
common people’s problems, so young people are also able to use their own
methods to come up with solutions.
(Wang, 2011)
From what I observed from a brief visit to NPI’s headquarters in Shanghai, creativity is
not as stifled there compared to in Nanjing, and available facilities are used to their fullest
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potential. NPI Shanghai’s office is called 724 Hub, “a Shanghai-based social enterprise incubator
providing capacity building and community support that inspires innovation” (Tin, 2020). Unlike
Yuhua Public Interest Makerspace, 724 Hub is an NPI entity in its entirety and was not built by
the Chinese Communist Party or Ministry of Civil Affairs. In 724 Hub, there is a fully
functioning snack bar, a mini golf set in one corner, children’s artwork on the walls as part of a
charity auction, and lying underneath someone’s desk is a large white dog, who from the fliers
and fan art around the office can be quickly identified as the official office mascot.
The vibrant energy is not necessarily tied to the location itself but to the NPI brand and
its employees. During my internship, I had the opportunity to observe and assist at the second
and third workshop of a three-part NPI-sponsored training series designed for non-profits in their
incubation programs across the country. Rather than a lecture style with minimal questions for
the teacher that is most common in traditional Chinese classes no matter the content taught or the
age of the audience, the NPI workshop leaders sought to create an upbeat atmosphere with
maximum interaction by incorporating icebreaker games, rally cries, small group discussions,
brainstorming sessions, and small prizes.
The “Program Purchasing Area” of Yuhua Public Interest Makerspace refers to the
services for registration, evaluation, legal supervision that social organizations need. It also
encompasses project bidding and government grant programs. NPI Nanjing plays a role in this
process by guiding its “incubatees” through these legal processes and recognition programs. The
fourth function, the “Training and Cultivation” aspect of the Makerspace, refers to NPI
Nanjing’s incubation program and other training opportunities hosted in the Makerspace. These
other events have included guest lectures by social workers, brainstorming sessions on how best
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to meet one’s customers’ needs, and feedback sessions for organizations pitching their proposed
projects to local government sponsors.
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Day-to-Day at NPI Nanjing
Each year NPI Nanjing accepts between seven and 12 organizations into its incubation
program. As advertised on Wechat in Chinese, the services provided for up to a year by the
incubation program include the following:
- Between one and 12 months’ complimentary usage of office space
- Complimentary usage of classroom and conference room space
- Capacity building services, including services focused on product development
for early-stage organizations, and a host of specialized courses on the
organizational development sector
- Management consultation services with social innovation advisors on strategic
development, internal management, human resources, product development,
capital building, financial management, sustainable development, marketing, and
more
- Capital development services and resources for applying for funding; marketing
influence investment services for applicable social enterprises
- Networking, regular networking events on social innocation topics, helping
social entrepreneurs enter the circle and receive the network’s resources and
support
- Other services, with specifics established according to the needs of the
incubatees
(Li, 2017)
Moreover, requirements for applicants include the following:
- Having a mission of solving social problems: you discover social problems,
understand the users’ demands, creatively solve problems, wish to create
sustainable business model
- full-time entrepreneur, be in the startup phase: you must be fully devoted, have
business partners, and be in the early stages
- sector not limited: elderly, disabilities, education, culture, gender, community
development, physical education and other social issues are all acceptable
- the status is not limited: social service organization, social group, foundation,
business, are all acceptable. You can choose whichever legal registration method
works best for your startup.
- Location limited: Nanjing
- Incubation recruitment period: applications open year-round
(Li, 2017)
During my internship period, the heads of eight startup organizations maintained a parttime schedule in an office space. There were morning and afternoon shifts, but they could also
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choose to stay all day. NPI Nanjing’s manager was insistent that a few people be present every
day, and one day she insisted that as many people as possible come in last-minute to be present
for a walk-through by visiting government officials so that the office space would look as filled
as possible and everyone could introduce themselves. Every Friday afternoon there was a
meeting for everyone in which the organizations would provide updates. NPI employees would
give advice in those meetings but would also schedule one-on-one advising sessions as needed.
One of the organizations, Nature Seeking, decided to no longer receive NPI’s services
while I was interning at NPI Nanjing. The group of three starting the organization, two with a
background in early childhood education and one with a background in physics, had their own
temporary office in a different district of Nanjing. The individual who had been coming to the
Makerspace expressed that the services were not as helpful as he had hoped, and he wasn’t sure
their organization would adopt a non-profit model. He also expressed frustration of bureaucracy
and impractical formalities with staying at the Makerspace. Nature Seeking was focused on early
childhood education and after-school enrichment activities. They wanted to design and build a
playroom with a children’s library. They wanted to provide STEM-focused early childhood
activities, so they were compiling simple science experiments. They asked me for ideas as well
as insight into the American education system, and we quickly ran into firewall issues when I
wanted to share videos from Youtube, which is blocked in China; I had a VPN, but they did not.
Upon asking if I felt underutilized at NPI, Nature Seeking suggested I start visiting their office at
least once a week to continue offering them my perspective. Ultimately, the organization left the
Makerspace, and I chose to continue interning full-time at NPI Nanjing.
In May of 2017, seven of the 12 organizations that were a part of NPI Nanjing’s
incubation program in Yuhuatai were selected to continue to receive the incubator’s services.
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They underwent a midterm evaluation ceremony in which they took turns presenting the present
and future activities the organizations have offered. Multiple members of the local Civil Affairs
Bureau were present, and so were the administrative heads of Yuhuatai’s sub-districts.
The following is a list of the organizations’ names and the services they described during
the ceremony that they planned to provide to the community, if they had not begun to do so
already (Nanjing Enpai, 2017):
Manle Growing Intellect Public Welfare Service Center provides puzzles and board
games for the elderly and sponsors clubs and competitions for increased engagement. They aim
to prevent Alzheimer’s and dementia and improve the social and mental well-being of
participants.
Analepsis Elderly Care Services Guidance Center is led by an international recovery
medicine expert along with nurses, doctors, and therapists.
Chuntian Nutrition Education Public Welfare Service Center offers nutrition
education to elementary students and their families.
Zhongci Public Welfare Development Center will provide free and reduced-cost
breakfast to vulnerable populations.
Sunflower Public Welfare Service Center will create a secondhand clothing store.
Yuhua Jialing Community Help Center promotes trust, communication, volunteerism,
and neighborliness within a residential community.
Safety+ Specialized Camp plans to offer home safety, emergency response, and first aid
education to elementary and middle school students and families.
While the data I had collected and described in the previous chapter does not provide
details on the innerworkings of state-society relations in China, this examination of NPI suggests
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that NGO development in China is heavily influenced by the Chinese Communist Party and
private sector funding alternatives. The party-state has become increasingly wary of private
sector funding from international NGOs for grassroots organizations, as evident in the
requirement under the Foreign NGO Law for international NGOs to register through the Ministry
of Public Security. The restrictions on these funding alternatives could make organizations
increasingly more reliant on the party-state and on incubators such as NPI for operational
survival. How embedded and involved the CCP is on grassroots organizations’ day-to-day
operations can also affect the atmosphere of an office space by hampering the sense of
innovation for tackling social issues. Further research could be conducted to determine how nonprofit incubators in China can encourage social innovation while bridging the gaps in preparing
emerging NGOs for successful navigation of the party-state’s restrictions when official
registration and government funding are necessary.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
This thesis analyzes the legal environment that Chinese nongovernmental organizations
navigate through an examination of policy changes, a study of 120 organizations, and a case
study of the support organization NPI. While grassroots organizations have not prompted
political liberalization in China, they have not been entirely co-opted by the party-state either. A
crackdown against civil society under Xi Jinping and the implementation of new laws for NGOs
in China have sought to close loopholes and standardize registration procedures. This study
suggests there is not significant variation in registration status across regions or issue areas, but
the closer examination of NPI shows that party-state preferences do influence how the NGO
sector operates in China, from driving program funding source options, to affecting the
atmosphere of office work environments.
Responses to Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Most, but not all, of the organizations in China Development
Brief’s NGO Directory will be able to be found in the Ministry of Civil Affairs
database.
The Ministry of Civil Affairs’ creation of the online database for all registered social
organizations serves as evidence of state standardization, and so does the finding, confirming the
first hypothesis, that the majority of the selected entries in China Development Brief’s NGO
directory are discoverable within the MoCA database. An organization’s presence in CDB
implies a level of wanting to connect with the NGO sector across China, stay abreast of news and
challenges of the NGO sector, and recruit talent that is passionate or at least interested in nonprofit work. Similar platforms exist in China, however, so this is not to say that inclusion in
CDB’s directory is the only way for NGOs in China to achieve these goals. An organization’s
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presence in the MoCA database is important because it not only indicates government-sanctioned
legitimacy for the organization but also suggests cooperation with bureaucratic policy and
networking skills, especially when supervisory units are needed.
The presence of the organizations in both databases, represented by 72% of the
organizations studied, is significant because it provides evidence that China is institutionalizing
registration protocols across the country. This institutionalization is a deviation from the past
when it was more common for grassroots organizations to remain in a legal gray area and operate
without consequences as long as they maintained a positive relationship with contacts in the local
government. This shift to standardized procedures reflects the development of institutional
relationships for the purpose of controlling civil society. As such, while studying the NGO sector
in other authoritarian states, it would be fruitful to examine their legal systems.
Hypothesis 2: Organizations specializing in more sensitive issues (LGBT+ issues,
migrant labor rights, left-behind children) might be listed in the CDB directory
but not in the MoCA database.
There was no evidence of a lack of official registration status being tied to any particular
issue areas, which does not support the second hypothesis stating that organizations specializing
in more sensitive issues might be listed in the CDB directory but not in the MoCA database. The
lack of evidence could indicate that the hypothesis is flawed in its assumption of what constitutes
a sensitive issue area in China. Moreover, rather than an organization’s particular issue area itself
being the reason for its inability to register, registration problems could stem from other factors
that influence the state’s perception of how great a threat the organization poses. This threat
could be a perceived sense of the organization seeking to challenge the state’s authority, an
existential threat to the ruling Chinese Communist Party. This perception could stem from the
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registering individuals’ reputation in the community or interactions with individual government
officials.
The Chinese Communist Party has found many ways to use formal NGO registration as a
way to control organizations independent of issue area. As described in the previous chapter, the
government may deem that there are already too many NGOs in a city or too many of a certain
issue area, and the government serves as the gatekeeper for registration and most funding
measures. Standardized, enforced registration policy serves as a bureaucratic hurdle for NGOs
and helps ensure that the sector develops only in ways that are permissible to the party-state. By
playing a prominent role in many NPI offices, the CCP is able to monitor the support provided to
grassroots organizations. In NPI Nanjing’s case, while the local Ministry of Civil Affairs has its
own dedicated standalone building within walking distance of Yuhua Public Interest
Makerspace, MoCA owns and maintains the makerspace in which party-sponsored groups and
meetings are hosted. MoCA contracts some of NPI’s services for select grassroots organizations,
thus allowing NPI Nanjing to be based in the makerspace as well.
Hypothesis 3: Provinces with more developed economies (Beijing and Guangdong) will
have a lower proportion of organizations listed in the Ministry of Civil Affairs database.
This study’s findings do not particularly support the third hypothesis that provinces with
more developed economies would have a lower proportion of organizations registered in the
MoCA database. The most and least developed economies were split on their proportions of
registered organizations, with Gansu and Guangdong having the most registered organizations
(22 and 25, respectively), and Yunnan and Beijing having the least (19 and 20, respectively).
This could indicate that economic development does not have a significant influence on
organizations’ registration type of status in an area, but a larger study including more
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organizations from a greater number of provinces and municipalities would help bolster these
claims.
Hypothesis 4: Due to lower levels of economic development, Yunnan and Gansu
will have a higher number of organizations dedicated to poverty alleviation and
education than Beijing and Guangdong.
The fourth hypothesis that Yunnan and Gansu would have a higher number of
organizations dedicated to poverty alleviation and education compared to Beijing and
Guangdong was incorrect, but these issue areas also proved to be too broad for categorizing the
organizations’ mission sets. Poverty alleviation and education services come in many forms and
can be adapted to address vulnerable populations in both urban and rural settings, so these issue
areas may not be as geographically determined as originally predicted. NGOs play a crucial role
in filling gaps in China’s social safety net, and the types of recipients of these services may vary
across locations based on economic factors even when the broader issue area remains the same.
For example, education can come in the form of classes for “left-behind” children in a less
developed region or as classes for migrant laborers in a developed city.
Activism can and does occur under a wide variety of economic circumstances, but
economic development can affect the number of resources to which citizens have access for
organized activism. There is a higher volume of entries in CDB NGO directory that are based in
Beijing and Guangdong (360 and 264, respectively, at the time of data collection) than in
Yunnan and Gansu (37 and 41, respectively). There is likely an increased popularity of corporate
social responsibility in these more developed areas as well, giving non-profits access to more
sources of funding and volunteers. Most of NPI’s offices are in eastern China, where there are
higher levels of economic development. There is an NPI office in the capital of Yunnan, but
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there are not any in Gansu; however, there are multiple offices in Beijing and Shanghai. As such,
NGOs in less economically developed places in western China do not have the same access to
incubator programs. As the political and legal environment for international NGOs becomes
increasingly hostile in China, grassroots organizations seeking to tackle social issues will
increasingly have to turn to domestic party-state resources for assistance.
While this study did not support most of the hypotheses, the findings still provide insight
into the nature of China’s NGO sector and an aspect of the state-society relationship in
authoritarian states. This study showcases the diversity of grassroots organizations in China.
Some seek to address niche issues in creative ways, such as Fengling Nonprofit Family Photos’
providing free photography sessions in mountainous regions of Yunnan, and Shenzhen Longyue
Charitable Foundation’s repatriating veterans’ remains, while others have broad missions that
share similarities with organizations in other areas. Incubators like NPI help encourage
innovation as they guide organizations through appropriate registration and funding options.
Overall, this study has shown that regional differences and issue areas may not account for
variation in the state’s perception of grassroots groups in a legal environment that emphasizes
standardization. This suggests the regional lens is less helpful than scholars imagined for
studying modern China. The findings also reflect that formal registration is a means for
monitoring and controlling organizations no matter their region and issue area.
Implications for State-Society Relations in China
Out of the literature’s historical characterizations of China’s NGO sector,
democratization, corporatism and contingent symbiosis, this study shows that China’s current
environment for state-society relations in the NGO sector most aligns with the corporatist
approach. Contingent symbiosis was used to describe the phenomenon where unregistered
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organizations in China were largely left alone to address social issues. As such, China’s greater
emphasis on official registration in recent years does not fit into this paradigm. However, even in
the current increasingly legalistic environment with co-optation from the party-state, practical
concerns allow both the NGO sector and the party-state to benefit in the symbiotic relationship.
While China does not forbid the bottom-up formation of grassroots organizations as it once did,
the continued existence of GONGOs, as well as the party-states monitoring and influence on
grassroots organizations, demonstrates that the corporatist approach to studying NGOs is still
very applicable to China.
This study of 120 organizations and the incubator NPI shows that the relationship
between China’s domestic NGOs and the party-state is most driven by pragmatic concerns. This
has resulted in a relationship that is inter-dependent and legalistic. The NGOs and party-state are
dependent upon each other because the organizations can provide useful services in the
community that reduce the burden on government resources. Contracted incubators such as NPI
can increase the efficacy of these services, which benefits both the incubatees and the
government. The grassroots organizations, in turn, are dependent on the government for
sponsorship as needed, some funding, and support, even if it comes in the form of tacit
sanctioning. The grassroots organizations ultimately are at the mercy of the party-state for being
able to continue their operations. Each side must balance their priorities with what the other side
can offer, but the party-state tends to have the upper hand.
China’s increased legislation on NGOs is a pragmatic strategy for monitoring the NGO
sector. The legalistic environment allows the government to maintain legitimacy as they enforce
prescribed protocol. On the surface, this reduces arbitrary arrests and closures. The Center for
Not-for-Profit Law notes that even China’s recent laws that do not directly mention NGOs, such
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as the Counter-Espionage Law, Counter-Terrorism Law, and National Security Law, go hand-inhand with this increased regulation and the security focus of Xi Jinping’s administration (ICNL,
2019, p. 4). While one may argue that the CCP’s concerns are more ideological than pragmatic
in nature, the party-state’s primary concern is long-term survival, and emphasizing ideology as it
regulates NGOs is a means for asserting legitimacy and stability for this pragmatic concern for
survival.
China’s NGOs must pragmatically consider their survival as well. Their continued
operations often hinge on adapting to party-state preferences. This adaptation is not a “necessary
evil” for less-developed organizations, but rather, an avenue for a sense of structure and a lifeline
for accessing communities governed by the lowest levels of government. The government can
then contract incubators to provide the additional, individualized training that the local
government and party bodies are not equipped to provide directly. As such, China’s case
demonstrates that state-society relations are not necessarily always conflictual. Many NGO
leaders look to the government for training, funding, and guidance. These lessons can be applied
to the study of NGOs in other countries and to other aspects of state-society relations. Examining
the costs and benefits of decisions being made allows one to recognize pragmatic issues at hand
and any ulterior motives. In doing so, one should not neglect the nonconflictual potential of
state-society relations that arises from areas of mutual benefit.
Scope Limitations
The findings of this study are somewhat limited by the scope and methodology. I had
made the first hypothesis with the assumption that unregistered organizations would be less
willing to publicly advertise themselves on China Development Brief, thus reducing the
likelihood of finding unregistered organizations within the dataset from the very beginning. As
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such, a limitation of this study is that it does not encompass organizations that have remained out
of public view. Conducting an in-depth study of such organizations would have been near
impossible since it would require an extensive network of local contacts who are aware of these
groups. Even then, the organizations who are skirting prescribed legal protocols for registration
would likely be resistant to surveys or interviews for fear of the consequences of exposure.
Another limitation is this study’s sample size. With 30 organizations per location, it is
difficult to detect significant patterns. A larger sample size would give a stronger indication of a
correlation, or lack thereof, between registration status and primary issue area and region.
However, the CDB NGO directory only has 37 entries for Yunnan, so the sample size could not
have been increased much more with the chosen research design. Moreover, each entry contains
valuable additional information about the organization that can only be processed and transcribed
manually by someone with the ability to read Chinese.
Censorship remains a barrier to studying NGOs in China, which can be said for many
areas of study in authoritarian states that have the technological ability to effectively control
speech and the press. It was no different for this study. When attempting to access the original
NGOCN report described in a translated summary article by China Development Brief, I found
that the entire website was inaccessible—the page displayed an error in Chinese that it had been
shut down. The report had provided details on why certain organizations in a study had not
registered themselves, I later found its website with a different URL, ngocn2.org as opposed to
ngocn.org.
NGOCN is a news outlet that reports on developments in the NGO sector, including
relevant policies and social issues (China Development Brief, n.d.). This is not the first time or
way that this news outlet has been censored. The introduction to a Chinese article in China
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Digital Times that was originally published via NGOCN’s official Wechat account the previous
year explains that NGOCN’s Wechat account has been shut down multiple times (China Digital
Times, 2016). China Digital Times is a California-based “independent, bilingual media
organization that brings uncensored news and online voices from China to the world” (China
Digitial Times, n.d.). The article they republished from NGOCN, titled “We are Not the State’s
Public Enemy” （“我们不是国家公敌“）, is an open letter to China’s legislators in response to
the Foreign NGO Law. The lack or loss of direct access to certain sources, while potentially
frustrating, only highlights the tension of state-society relations and shows that it is worth further
study.
Future Research
Ideally this study of 120 organizations would be replicated with the entirety of CDB’s
NGO directory so that one could analyze a dataset of over 2,000 entries that have been crossreferenced with the MoCA database of registered social organizations. This would cover all
province-level administrative regions for additional analysis. The larger sample size would likely
lessen the ambiguity of the findings as they relate to the hypotheses. I would recommend further
analysis on entries for which registration details cannot be found in the database because, as
explained and explored in Chapter 3, a lack of presence does not necessarily denote that the
group was not legally accounted for through other means, especially since CDB’s NGO directory
allows entries from a wide variety of groups and platforms. As discovered through reading the
organization summaries, these other means of accountability include university affiliation,
website registration, or for-profit business status with the Ministry of Commerce.
In addition to increasing sample size, the study would also benefit from expanding the
source of the data beyond China Development Brief’s NGO directory. This would mean finding
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additional directories or establishing personal connections to learn about organizations in an
area. An alternative for expanding this research would be to request access to the Ministry of
Civil Affairs’ full database since the website currently requires input of at least an organization’s
name for it to display any search results. However, the likelihood of a scholar being granted this
access is low. The province-level divisions could be ranked by economic development, and the
organizations for each could be separated out by multiple tiers of primary issue area
categorization for comparison among broader categories and more specific ones as needed.
While using a full list of only Ministry of Civil Affairs entries would not capture organizations
that had never been registered, analyzing the existing data would allow for a comparison of the
types of registered organizations across regions. Effectively studying unregistered organizations
would require using data that does not heavily rely on online sources since they are subject to
state censorship.
Another avenue for future research is comparisons of these findings with those of
international NGOs operating in China. The shift to requiring registration with the Ministry of
Public Security demonstrates a concern for national security and a delineation in how domestic
and foreign entities are perceived. This invites more research into how the Foreign NGO Law
and resulting decrease in the number of active foreign NGOs in China is affecting domestic
groups. In the absence of help from foreign NGOs, local organizations may rely on the
government for resources and advice, or they may strengthen their resolve to find these answers
on their own or through partnerships with local private companies and through incubator
programs.
The future of Chinese civil society will continue to struggle as it operates in an
authoritarian space. However, as existing NGOs have more time to develop their practices and
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take advantage of newly available incubator programs, a more professionalized NGO sector
could emerge. This would provide new challenges for the party-state, but it would also likely
result in improved social service delivery that could elevate the development of the country as a
whole, leaving the state with even better opportunities to compete on the world stage.
With China’s increased investments in Africa and the rise of China’s status in
international relations, scholars may also anticipate the increased presence of Chinese NGOs in
other countries. Government-organized NGOs would more likely play this role, but grassroots
aid organizations may eventually establish a presence abroad too. If there is not an increase in
Chinese NGOs abroad, scholars could investigate if it is due to a barrier of traditional cultural
values that promotes helping only members of one’s own family and local community, or if it is
simply the Chinese government limiting organized efforts abroad that are not officially
sanctioned by the state. Scholars should expect Chinese NGOs to face Chinese government
scrutiny abroad just as they would face within China.
Professionalizing the NGO Sector
While the literature on state-society relations makes it simpler to assume that NGOs
would easily thrive without government barriers, the case study of NPI suggests government
policies are not necessarily the only factor holding grassroots organizations back from thriving.
Grassroots leaders in a landscape where NGOs have not always been embraced as a viable sector
for a career can lack the project management, grant writing, and financial accounting skills
required for success. Incubators like NPI, with their trainings on social innovation and
entrepreneurship, can help fill these gaps in China. More research can be conducted on how the
Chinese Communist Party in particular hinders NGOs’ day-to-day operations, especially in the
indirect ways that it may shape office culture, as suggested in observations of differences
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between the NPI offices in Shanghai and Nanjing. Differences in the acceptable level of
collaboration and use of creative spaces could significantly impede growth and development of
the sector.
The state benefits from professionalization of the NGO sector, so it establishes
competitive contracting for social services and sets standards for the organizations to meet. Too
much control over this process can hinder NGO development, however, which could
inadvertently stymie the country’s overall social and economic development. Yijia Jing,
professor in Public Administration and Associate Director of Foreign Affairs at Fudan
University, states that strategies for empowerment of the nonprofit sector have been hampered by
the existing political environment in which the government generally distrusts that which is not
under its direct control (Jing, 2015, p. 605). Still, from the perspective of an authoritarian regime,
the nature of China’s state-society relationship yields lessons to be learned. Other states can
follow China’s example in establishing policies that seemingly provide citizens the space to
solve collective problems while supervising their practices.
Effects of the Overton Window
The states’ policy options for constraining civil society will be affected by the Overton
Window. The concept of the Overton Window dictates that policies are constrained by a political
climate based on the constituents’ ideas of what is acceptable versus what is considered extreme
on a spectrum of policy options. Minor, incremental changes are much more likely to win
support and shift this “window” of politically viable policies (Russell, 2006). As such, while
politicians in authoritarian states are not bound to public opinion in the same way as they are in
democracies for winning elections, public opinion still matters for the legitimacy and stability of
the incumbent. The case of China’s current NGO sector demonstrates that an authoritarian state
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can crack down on civil society with little repercussions through its implementation of
increasingly standardized policies.
Through more direct control of education and the media, authoritarian states can shape
public opinion and more effectively censor contrary viewpoints. As such, policies that are at least
on the surface accepted by the public in an authoritarian state could fall outside of the window of
acceptable policies in most democratic states. An example of this is China’s planned birth
policies. For NGOs specifically, by framing new policies as an issue of minimizing scams from
illegitimate charitable organizations and reducing threats to national security, the state attempts
to pull the window of acceptable policies into one that accepts extensive oversight of the NGO
sector.
Even so, there is also a history of grassroots organizations in China pushing back against
the state and, in some cases, successfully preventing or altering policy decisions. NGOs can shift
the window of accepted policies as they expose corruption, environmental abuse, and other
scandals. Grassroots environmental NGOs in China have been particularly effective at raising
awareness of China’s pollution and have successfully influenced policies by placing pressure on
the Chinese state to act. Developing a means through which to effectively monitor potential
threats to political stability caused by this pressure from NGOs has motivated the party-state to
implement standardized policies to better control civil society.
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